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Introduction
After a long period of estrangement, Brazilian relations with the Afri-
can continent overcame rhetoric and gained new force with the Luiz Inácio 
Lula da Silva government. The particular attention payed to these relations 
reflects an old aspiration of Brazil, that until then had not been pursued 
with determination. The historical bonds, the country’s large population of 
afro-descendants and the internal debate on racial equality, are elements in 
the Brazilian view regarding the need for rapprochement and cooperation. 
Even though Africa is a continent with alarming poverty indexes, it is not a 
stagnant one. The dynamism and development of “African” alternatives for 
its own problems define the stance of many of its leaderships.
The discourse and diplomatic exercise during the Lula government 
converged towards the building of preferential alliances with partners in the 
scope of South-South relations. The Dilma Rousseff government kept the 
interest in relations with the continent, but redefined the axis in regards to 
its priority. Nevertheless, the African continent represented one of the areas 
of greatest diplomatic investment during the 2000s. The President Lula and 
Foreign Relations Minister Celso Amorim, during their first term, made 
several visits and established numerous agreements with different African 
countries. In just over two years in office, there were four trips to the con-
tinent, resulting in visits to seventeen countries. The rapprochement with 
the African continent is not only focused on the accomplishment of short 
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Practices”, Bangalore, India, 2017.
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term results, even though, under the economic aspect, Africa presents itself 
as an important market.
In that sense, despite weakened, Brazil’s African policy is diplomat-
ically dynamic, gaining special importance when Brazilian actions in the 
continent are considered. However, the political, economic and sociocultural 
dynamics has, in both regions and varied historical moments, made the rela-
tions either more difficult or easier. In a number of periods, Brazil’s actions 
resulted from a mistaken understanding of its foreign policy priorities. Such 
actions, ignoring the country’s long term political and strategic interests, and 
taking into account only the short term economic and financial interests, 
postponed the implementation and renewal of bilateral projects, as well as 
the establishing of multilateral cooperation agreements. It is therefore appro-
priate to analyze the trajectory of the relations between Brazil and Africa.
From the slave nexus to estrangement
Africa’s and Brazil’s history are closely related, since Portuguese 
colonists occupied both South Atlantic shores in the 16th century. With the 
arrival in Brazil of the first African slaves, in 1533, following the construction 
of the first sugar mill in the São Vicente village, a long period of close links 
initiated, mostly because of the slave trade, which extended until 1850, when 
its decline began. Thus:
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Table 1: Slave trade – arrival estimates of Africans in Brazil, 
1531-1780 
Arrival Estimates of Africans
Period In the period Annual average
% over total slaves taken to 


















Total 1,895,500 - 33
(1) This estimate excludes Africans sent to Europe or the Atlantic islands, a movement 
that only had importance in the 16th century.
Source: Linhares, 1990
These relations were not of less importance to the global stage, 
because, if in the 17th century the South Atlantic was the dynamic center of 
the world economy, with Brazil boosting the Portuguese Atlantic Empire; in 
the 18th century it was surpassed by the North Atlantic, due to the rising of 
powers like France and England3. Despite the Eurocentric view of Africa as a 
sparsely inhabited and cultural and socially primitive continent, based on the 
contacts established by merchants and colonial employees (often uninterested 
3 See Rodrigues, José Honório. 1964. Brasil e África: outro horizonte. Rio de Janeiro: Civiliza-
ção Brasileira, 2a ed.
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in deepening their understanding of the lands around them), important civ-
ilizations have developed in the region, allowing the creation and mastering 
of techniques posteriorly exported to the New World.
These cultures already had slavery as a consolidated practice, with 
records been found from the second millennium B.C. detailing captures in 
the Nubia region. This institution, however, becomes usual only from the 
contact with the Islamized people of the north of the continent, who since 
the 9th century undertook expeditions to the south of the Sahara with that 
intent. A number of African societies begun, thus, to be strongly based on 
slavery bonds. The Tuareg had, in the beginning of the 19th century (impor-
tantly: before direct European interference), 70% of its population made up 
of slaves; in the Sahel region, this number was around 50%; and in the great 
kingdoms of the continent, near the rain forests, the percentage reached 20%.
When the Portuguese arrived, in the 15th century, the practice inten-
sified, given that the breaking of the monopoly of the eastern spices trade 
forced the creation of colonial enterprises, demanding a large, ever-growing 
amount of manpower to the maintenance of its plantations. In the Lusitanian 
case, the main target was Brazil, with which the metropolis was beginning 
to strengthen the domination ties, vital to the preservation of its Portuguese 
Empire.
It is worth noting that, with this, the Europeans also significantly 
altered the profile sought among slaves, abandoning the preference for chil-
dren and women and favoring young men, able to resist the rigors imposed 
in the plantations. Regardless, the estimates point that, for every slave landed 
in America, another died in Africa during the capture process, making the 
population loss even more dramatic4.
As it has been shown, during the Colonial and most of the Imperial 
periods of Brazilian history, millions of Africans were brought to country, so 
that the Europeanization of the new lands was followed by its Africanization. 
The historiography highlights the African contribution to the makings of the 
Brazilian society with its culture, art and religion, besides the demographic 
aspects. But the Africans also brought techniques that boosted agriculture, 
cattle raising, mining and the fight against diseases, given that the knowl-
edge possessed by the Portuguese was inadequate to the development of 
the tropical world. The metal casting and utensils production, as well as 
the introduction of a number of political behaviors and social organization 
patterns were also important African contributions.
4   See Linhares, Maria Yedda (org.). 1990. História geral do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 
9a ed. 
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 The King of Benin was the first sovereign to recognize Brazil’s inde-
pendence, in 1823, and, between 1822 and 1830, there was a strong political 
movement across the Atlantic aiming to turn Angola into a part of Brazil, 
given the economic bonds created by the slave trade and the fact that most 
of the Angolan colonial elite was Brazilian. Only the pressure of the English 
diplomacy prevented it, remaining the African country a Portuguese colony. 
At the same time, a colonial era phenomenon ensued: the returning of former 
slaves to Africa, particularly to the Gulf of Guinea, where they constituted an 
elite that, in the eyes of the natives, was westernized.
The English pressure for the end of the slavery was ever growing 
and the promulgation of the Aberdeen Act (1845), allowing the boarding of 
any ship carrying slaves, resulted in an important increase of the clandestine 
trade. The Brazilian slave owners, trying to enlarge their stock before the 
trade was definitely extinct, ended up indebted and decapitalized. The state 
reacted with the promulgation of the Eusébio de Queiroz Act, that, in 1850, 
officially prohibited the trade. That was, however, followed by a spirit that 
aimed the creation of a “white and westernized” society, with the “whitening” 
ideology and the immigration of European workers. After all, the Brazilian 
elite considered the country as having a European political regime, monarchy, 
and a European dynasty, the Bragança, being obliged to differentiate itself 
from its neighbors.
The end of the trade coincided with the beginning of the European 
colonial expanse in Africa, resulting in the regression of relations and absence 
of contacts between Africa and Brazil. In the first half of the 20th century, 
ninety percent of Brazil’s trade with the continent was exclusively with South 
Africa. After the Second World War, the relations with Portugal were priority 
for successive Brazilian governments, that bargained the electoral support 
of the Lusitan immigrants (encouraged by Salazar, through the “Casas de 
Portugal” – Houses of Portugal), in exchange for Brazilian support to the 
Portuguese colonialism in UN forums. Furthermore, Brazil avoided support-
ing decolonization, given that Dakar was a strategic point for the aeronaval 
communications with Europe and Portugal was a member of NATO.
The contradictory rapprochement with postcolonial Africa
In 1952, Vargas signed the Brazil-Portugal Treaty on Friendship and 
Consultation, that Kubitschek took even further, with the proposal of the 
establishment of a Portuguese-Brazilian Community. It was the time of Gil-
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berto Freire and his luso-tropicalism, giving Salazar, leader of the Portuguese 
fascism, a theoretical basis for the maintenance of the colonial empire in 
Africa and the turning of Brazil into a paradigm for its assimilation policy 
though the legal fiction of the “Overseas Provinces”. As compensation, a 
Coffee Agreement was signed (the African production competed with the 
Brazilian), in a moment in which the European Economic Community was 
formed (1957) and the Itamaraty (Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Relations) was 
restructured, creating a Commercial Department.
In addition to the persistence of what José Honório Rodrigues (1964) 
called the “old conservative mentality of Mr. Raul Fernandes” (chancellor5 
from 1946 to 1951 and 1954 to 1955), typical of the Cold War alignment, the 
introduction of the Pan-American Operation by JK, in 1958, restricted Brazil’s 
foreign policy to America. The African independences, started exactly during 
the Kubitschek government, were largely overlooked. In 1960, the African 
year, seventeen countries became independent, and Brazil adopted a merely 
protocol stance. The triggering of the Independent Foreign Policy, in the 
Jânio Quadros government, was fundamental to the gaining of importance 
of Africa to the Brazilian diplomacy.
With the Independent Foreign Policy, from 1961 to 1964, a rapproche-
ment began to take shape, followed by a new estrangement during the two 
first military governments (1964-1969). From the Médici government to the 
end of the Sarney government (1969-1990), there was a qualitative leap in the 
Brazil-Africa relations, involving intense cooperation in a number of areas, 
but the coming to power of the neoliberal administrations, from Fernando 
Collor de Mello to Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) (1990-2002), following 
the globalization tendencies, resulted in renewed distancing. However, with 
the turn of the century, particularly with the beginning of the Luiz Inácio 
“Lula” da Silva government, the African continent would finally become a 
priority to Brazil.
In 1961, with the announcement of the Independent Foreign Pol-
icy by Jânio Quadros and his chancellor Afonso Arinos, Brazil started an 
African policy and took a stand in favor of the right to self-determination of 
colonized peoples, especially in the Portuguese colonies, that were beginning 
their armed fights. Such a stance, that brought tensions with Lisbon, was 
not exempt from setbacks, given the action of the powerful pro-Portuguese 
lobby. Anyway, Itamaraty created an African Division, a navigation line was 
established and five Embassies opened: Senegal (visited by Afonso Arinos), 
Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Ghana. In relation to the last one, an inter-
5 Minister of Foreign Relations.
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esting episode took place when Quadros designated as Ambassador the black 
writer Raimundo de Souza Dantas. Kwame N’Krumah, the combative leader 
of the country, quipped: “if Brazil meant to show us it is not a racist country, 
it should have appointed a black [ambassador] to London, Washington or 
Paris, not Africa”.
The signing of a number of Cultural Agreements allowed the 
establishment of a scholarship program for African students in Brazil, that 
eventually became the Exchange Program for Students (PEC, in the Portu-
guese acronym). The country also denounced the Sharpeville massacre, in 
South Africa, and criticized the Apartheid, seeking to keep relations with the 
South Africans in a more discreet level, even though there was significant 
trade. Despite João Goulart, that took on the presidency following Quadros’ 
renounce, and his chancellor, San Tiago Dantas, keeping and even deepen-
ing the Independent Foreign Policy, there where hesitations and setbacks 
in the relations with Africa, given the weakness of the government and the 
ideological suspicions against it.
In fact, Quadros and Arinos desired to increase Brazil’s bargaining 
power against the USA, take advantage of new niche markets to Brazil’s 
increasing industrial production, projecting the country in the international 
stage and play the role of a link between the West and Africa, given the recess 
of colonialism. It is interesting that one of the government’s concerns was 
the “unfair competition” poised by the African countries because of their 
privileged access to European markets when it came to tropical products 
(coffee, sugar and cocoa), both as colonies, or because of the preferential 
bonds created after the independencies.
From the Cold War geopolitics to economic relations
This first draft of a South-South Cooperation, however, was consid-
erably set back by the 1964 military coup. Castelo Branco desired to end the 
politicization of the Independent Foreign Policy and set aside the Third-World-
ist discourse. Despite sending a commercial mission to West Africa, the new 
regime focused on improving relations with Portugal and, on behalf of the 
security of the South Atlantic, condemning the Marxist-influenced national 
liberation movements in Southern Africa. Once again, because of the geopo- 
litical approach of the Cold War, the collective security theme was rescued, 
both in regards to America (with the proposal of an Interamerican Defense 
Force), as to the South Atlantic (with the proposal of a South Atlantic Treaty 
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Organization – OTAS, in the Portuguese acronym). The last one implicated 
cooperation with the Portuguese colonialist and South African racist regimes. 
The Costa e Silva government, despite criticizing the great powers hegemony 
and moderating the discourse regarding multilateral defense mechanisms, 
did not promote rapprochement initiatives towards Africa during his short 
government (1967-1969).
Such initiatives took place during the Médici government, the regime’s 
most repressive one. In 1970, diplomatic relations with three countries were 
established and, in 1972, the chancellor Mário Gibson Barboza visited nine 
countries in the West and East Africa, signing many commercial, cultural 
and technical cooperation agreements. Because of the “Brazilian Miracle”, 
with its concentrated income and rapidly expanding industry, the country 
needed markets and raw materials, particularly oil. On the other hand, Bra-
zil’s intermediate and “tropicalized” technology was useful to the provision 
of services and served as an inspiring model to the African states. Brazil 
also needed the African sympathy to legitimate the expansion of its terri- 
torial sea to 200 miles, at the same time as the OTAS idea was forgotten. The 
“National Interest Diplomacy” of the Médici government, however, avoided 
the Southern African controversial agenda, where the national liberation 
wars preparing the final assault against the failing Portuguese colonialism.
The 1973 oil crisis, and the beginning of the Geisel government (1974-
1979), pointed towards a deepening of the African policy. Diplomatic relations 
were established with six countries in Africa, and Brazil was the first to rec-
ognize the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola’s (MPLA, in the 
Portuguese acronym) government, of Marxist inclinations, in November 1975. 
The firm condemnation of the Rhodesian and South African racist regimes 
marked, as well, the “Responsible Pragmatism” diplomacy under Geisel and 
the chancellor Azeredo da Silveira, characterized by a strong Third-World-
ist discourse. While Brazil exported consumer goods, food, cars and the 
building of infrastructure, it imported growing amounts of oil. Braspetro, a 
Petrobrás subsidiary, began prospection activities in Africa, the Vale do Rio 
Doce company developed mining projects and the Mendes Jr. and Odebrecht 
contractors built highways, bridges, harbors and hydroelectric dams.
The relations with Angola, Gabon, Nigeria and Argelia were the most 
intense, while Brazil received hundreds of African students into its univer-
sities, through the PEC program, and dozens of trainees in its companies, 
in particular in the state-owned ones. The “Universalism” diplomacy, under 
president Figueiredo (1979-1985), and chancellor Saraiva Guerreiro, main-
tained and expanded the Brazil-Africa cooperation. Figueiredo was the first 
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Brazilian president to officially visit Africa: Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, 
Cape Verde and Argelia. With the end of the Rhodesian racist regime, in 
1980, Brazil grew closer to the new Zimbabwe and continued to harshly 
criticize the South African racism and aggressions against the newly-freed 
countries. Beyond the ever-growing trade, the cooperation programs were 
intensified in a number of areas, while more African representations were 
established in Brasília.
The Sarney government, despite the growing economic difficulties 
and the problems originated in the international system, kept a high profile 
in the Brazil-Africa relations. He visited Cape Verde and, after, Angola and 
Mozambique, that faced difficulties because of the South African aggressions 
and civil war. In 1986, exactly during the Reagan Era and in a context of mil-
itarization of the South Atlantic (post-Malvinas), he managed the approval 
by the UN of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (Zopacas). In 
this context, in 1988, he promoted the I South Atlantic Summit, in Rio de 
Janeiro, with the participation of 19 African countries. The Namibian eman-
cipation, the Apartheid criticism and the support to peace in Angola (through 
the withdrawal of South African and Cuban forces) were important aspects 
of this policy, paired with the pursuit of development.
However, the obstacles were mounting. The impact of the debt crisis 
was strong in Brazil and even more so in Africa, devastated by the IMF’s 
adjustment plans and the Cold War conflicts. Thus, the first post-military 
government sought an inflection towards the Portuguese speaking countries, 
using the room left by Portugal, that joined the European Community. In 
1989, the I Portuguese-Speaking Countries Summit, in São Luís do Mara-
nhão, with the presence of Brazil, Portugal, and the Portuguese-Speaking 
African Countries (PALOPs, in the Portuguese acronym), resulting in the 
creation of the International Portuguese Language Institute, to be based in 
Cape Verde.
The era of transatlantic economic adjustments
The ascension of Fernando Collor de Mello to presidency and the 
adoption of neoliberalism as the economic policy in Brazil, in 1990, inau-
gurated a new time of absence towards Africa. The strategic objectives of 
the Washington Consensus guided Brazil’s new elite, stressing the vertical 
North-South relations, instead of the horizontal South-South ones. In the 
context of end of the Cold War and the creation of Mercosur, in 1991, Africa 
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was relegated to a secondary status, following a diplomatic First-Worldly 
and neoliberal view of globalization. The following decline in trade resulted 
from adjustment plans in both sides of the Ocean, the withdrawal of the state 
from the financing of exports and many areas of the economy and the need 
to buy oil from Argentina, as a way to balance the trade relations within the 
Mercosur.
In any way, the diplomatic transition in South Africa and the inde-
pendence of Namibia, that received Brazilian help to structure its war Navy, 
brought the president to the region in 1991. Meanwhile, the number of 
Brazilian diplomats in Africa constantly diminished: in 1973, they were 25, 
reaching 34 in 1989 and falling to 24 in 1996, already under Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso. Worse than that, the African status within the Itamaraty 
structure was reduced, together with that of the Middle East, in political- 
-administrative terms. All of these was done based on short-term cost-benefit 
views, despite the strategical policies undertaken by former administrations.
During the Itamar Franco government (1992-1994), with Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso and, then, Celso Amorim as chancellors, a certain level of 
articulated vision returned in regards to an African policy. Some key-coun-
tries were selected as priorities and the limited efforts in them centered. The 
new South Africa, Angola and Nigeria were the main focus of Brazil’s for-
eign policy, seeking to reach their neighbors through them. In 1993, Itamar 
Franco reactivated the Zopacas and, in the following year, hosted the Portu-
guese-Speaking Countries’ Chancellors Summit, in Brasília. More important, 
however, were the bilateral and multilateral (through the UN) supports to the 
peace process and rebuilding of some countries of the continent, particularly 
Angola.
During the FHC government (1995-2002), Africa’s role in Brazil’s 
foreign relations remained modest, though some important initiatives were 
made and a certain inflection occurred during his second term, posteriorly 
qualitatively deepened by the Lula government. From 1995, the Brazilian army 
actively partook in the UN’s peace missions in Angola and some other coun-
tries. In 1996, FHC visited Angola and South Africa, signing agreements on 
a number of areas and, in 1998, the president Mandela visited Brazil. In the 
year 2000, his country signed a Framework Agreement with the Mercosur.
In this sense, the cooperation in the public policies scope grew, espe-
cially when Brazil started its campaign to remove the patent rights of AIDS 
drugs, epidemic in the Southern Africa region. When the president, because 
of the Real crisis, began its critic against the “asymmetrical globalization”, 
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a greater convergence in the global diplomacy and its multilateral forums 
started, particularly in the economic area.
It is also important to point out that, since the end of the 1980s, Bra-
zil’s influence in Africa increased because of its television companies (espe-
cially its soap operas), of the evangelical churches6 and even the establishment 
of smuggling networks, drugs and arms trafficking and money laundering 
(in a two-way flow). Cultural and security aspects, thus, become common 
agendas in the relationship between both shores of the South Atlantic. Brazil 
has also come to receive refugees from the African continent.
The multidimensional cooperation era
The Lula presidency, from 2003, initiated a new chapter in the Brazil- 
-Africa relations, combining a new vision regarding the international order 
with internal social transformations. Already in his inaugural speech, the 
president nominated South Africa among the great developing powers (along 
with China, India and Russia) and stressed that the African continent would 
be a fundamental vector of his foreign policy, auto-defined by him as affirma-
tive and propositional. At the same time that the fight against poverty adopted 
effective solutions such as the “Fome Zero” (Zero Hunger), the “affirmative 
policies” sought to integrate the afro-descendants in the developments of 
the Brazilian society. In this sense, one of the initiatives, already in March 
2003, was the promotion of the admission of the group to the diplomatic 
staff, through preparatory scholarships for the Rio Branco Institute entrance 
examination.
Three months later the India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue 
Forum (IBSA or G-3) was announced, a South African initiative for South-
South cooperation. During his first term, Lula visited Africa on four occasions: 
in November 2003, he visited São Tomé and Príncipe, Angola, Mozambique, 
Namibia and South Africa; in July 2004, São Tomé and Príncipe, Gabon 
and Cape Verde; in April 2005, Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea Bissau 
and Senegal; and, in February 2006, Argelia, Benin, Botswana and South 
Africa. Ten new embassies were established and the number of diplomats 
in the African continent greatly increased. Besides maintaining concrete 
support to the peace and rebuilding processes, the president forgave the debt 
6 Only in South Africa there are more than 300 temples of the Universal Church of the 
Kingdom of God, where Brazilian ministers can even tell jokes in Zulu, but the phenomenon 
is even more intense in the Portuguese-speaking countries.
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a number of countries had with Brazil, granted loans and offered assistance 
in many areas.
In the educational scope, the Student Agreement Program (PEC, in 
the Portuguese acronyn) was enlarged and extended to the post-graduation 
level, with Brazilian scholarships and the cooperation regarding scientific 
research and professors exchange fomented. Courses in Africa and a num-
ber of seminars aiming at mutual acknowledgement on both shores of the 
Atlantic were promoted. Among these, the II Conference of Intellectuals from 
Africa and the Diaspora, that took place in Salvador, Bahia, in July 2006, is 
worth highlighting. Thus, Africa became Brazil’s most important laboratory 
on South-South relations, combined with the increasing bilateral trade.
While the opposition accused the government of “wasting money 
on a futureless continent”, Brazilian companies gained prominence in the 
region, consolidating their presence, above all Petrobras. If the Chinese and, 
more recently, Indian penetrations, aimed at economic goals, despite their 
contribution to infrastructure works, and the fresh North-American presence 
is related to geopolitical and security concerns, the cooperation with Brazil, 
aside from the undeniable material interests, introduced new elements.
These are the fight against poverty and epidemics (particularly HIV-
AIDS), the introduction and creation of technologies adapted to Third World 
problems and the active alliance in multilateral forums to defend common 
interests regarding development and the building of a multipolar and pacific 
global system. Two examples are the G-3 and the G-20, contributing to the 
strengthening of the African countries position in the WTO negotiations. 
Crowning this policy, took place, in Abuja, Nigeria, the I Africa - South 
America Summit (ASA), in November 2006, providing both regions with 
unprecedented international projection, much contributing to the “African 
Renaissance”. Meanwhile, black movements developed, seminars took place, 
legislations prohibiting racial discrimination were drafted and research cen-
ters specializing in African studies were established in Brazil.
How much of these is political discourse and economic interests, 
or the association between two peripherical regions seeking socioeconomic 
development, only time will tell. The African governments, on the one hand, 
face the need to overcome their assistentialist and victimized mentality, orig-
inated during the Cold War and aggravated because of the “lost decade”, and 
intensify their integration processes, against the challenging impact of the 
globalization. To overcome the colonial legacy of “divide and rule”, visible in 
the configuration of small and unfeasible states, is an urgent need. Mean-
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while, they must deepen their bonds related to foreign cooperation with an 
autonomist perspective, reversing the marginalization of the continent.
The development of capitalism in Africa, however, creates new 
contradictions, expressed through the emergence of modern ways of social 
inequality, that will, unavoidably, create new agendas and political actors in 
the future. Still, such economic development shall build the infrastructure 
and modernity Africa needs to obtain a more effective liberation than that 
found in the political discourse of other times. It is interesting to note, as 
an example, that the South-African urbanization, promoting the coexistence 
of not only national cultures and ethnicities, but of thousands of workers 
from other African nations, is generating a new culture. The black urban 
youngsters are transforming the English language, enriching it with new 
expressions and grammatical structures, at the same time that they use it as 
the common language.
Brazil, on the other hand, is a mixed-race country, not a “racial democ-
racy” (flawed conservative concept) nor a multicultural nation (European/
North-American post-modern concept). Miscegenation does not mean whit-
ening, but mixture, something related to a culture that ignores a number of 
differences and feels great attraction towards others. We are building our 
own culture, one in which the African element imparts a fundamental con-
tribution that needs recognition, and the social inequalities, through which 
black people are especially penalized, must be eliminated. Even so, amongst 
these many injustices, we show enormous tolerance, that could serve as a 
model for an intolerant world.
Far beyond the commercial aspect, Brazil can be an important partner 
to the African continent, provided that it can overcome certain internal politi-
cal, social and economic obstacles. Africa, in turn, is also interesting to Brazil, 
both in economic and political-cultural terms. Even though it is a developing 
Third World country, a First-Worldly temptation always presents itself to the 
Brazilian elites. Besides welcoming African students, Brazil should send its 
own students and tourists to Africa, which would contribute to the improve-
ment of our identity. Finally, the tension between a transoceanic cooperation 
facing towards the North Atlantic (resulting from the history of capitalism) 
and another facing towards the South Atlantic (based on the South-American 
integration, the association with Africa and the South-South cooperation), 
represents a fundamental contradiction. In this context, the Brazil-Africa 
relations are paramount to its overcoming.
After decades of stagnation, the African economy begins to show 
signs of important improvements. In the last decade, the continent has not 
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only experienced a constant acceleration of its economic growth, but also 
accompanied new opportunities for trade and investments. The African states 
have worked towards the promotion of economic growth based on regional 
political actions: the African Union (AU), the Southern African Develop-
ment Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
are clear signs of the will to overcome historic problems. Furthermore, their 
aims are defined by the Africans themselves, that take on all the difficulties 
related to projects of this size.
In this perspective, it is important to look into the potential of the 
Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP, in the Portuguese 
acronym). Few countries have received from the Itamaraty a treatment as 
differentiated as the members of the CPLP, that comprises a 22 million inhab-
itant population, besides Brazil, in four continents. Portugal, East Timor, 
Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Mozambique and Angola 
seek through Brazilian cooperation develop the security, business, health and 
education areas. Already in the first year of the Lula government, São Tomé 
and Príncipe, Mozambique and Angola received visits of the president7.
In this context, Brazil developed with the countries of the Commu-
nity strong bilateral cooperation programs. Among the most significant ones 
are the opening of technical education centers in Timor and Angola and the 
offering of electronic ballot boxes to the election in Guinea Bissau, that ended 
up postponed because of the military coup in the country. Furthermore, 
the installation of an antiretroviral drugs factory was agreed, bringing great 
enthusiasm to the members of the CPLP.
It is important to point out that Brazil, while chair of the organization, 
played a fundamental role in the diplomatic negotiations that contributed to 
the reestablishment of democracy in São Tomé and Príncipe. Additionally, a 
cooperation with the country’s National Oil Agency took place to help them 
develop their regulation and bidding system. The relations with Angola, tra-
ditional partner in a number of areas, was extended. Regarding Mozambique, 
commercial bonds were strengthened and a cooperation in the agricultural 
sector created. With all the countries of the Community, there were negotia-
tions involving agricultural development, the fight against AIDS and poverty. 
7 In the occasion, the possibilities for investments in a number of industry and commerce 
sectors were discussed. 128 businessmen accompanied Lula, interested in the expansion 
of exports. Cement and medicine factories were negotiated, as well as the construction of 
railways, the exploration of coal, exports of cellular phones, mounting of buses and sale of 
garbage collecting machines, amongst others. The estimates for the value of the negotiations 
surpassed US$ 1 billion. 
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Visiting the headquarters of CPLP, in Lisbon, president Lula highlighted 
the particular responsibility of the organization to revert the condition of 
extreme poverty of some peoples and the need to mobilize the international 
community.
The South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (Zopacas, in the 
Portuguese acronyn) also presents significant potential to the Brazilian diplo-
macy regarding the building of agreements in a multilateral scope, capable of 
uniting groups of nations with converging interests that can mutually support 
eachorther and favor common objectives in the global forums. Both CPLP and 
Zopacas provide intersection points for a number of economic integration 
processes in the South Atlantic region, favoring exchanges between the Mer-
cosur, SADC and ECOWAS. The Brazilian government has been significantly 
supporting a growing number of Brazilian business, mainly service exporters, 
that seek the African continent to the implementation of projects. Notably, 
the Vale do Rio Doce company won the competition to the exploration of the 
carboniferous complex of Moatize, in northern Mozambique, strengthening 
the country’s relations with Brazil.
The rapprochement with the African continent has shown to be an 
important development of the Brazilian foreign policy. Through a superficial 
evaluation, the strategy attracts criticism, so far as it can seem paradoxical to 
a developing country as Brazil to focus its diplomatic efforts on poor partners, 
with limited influence in the global geopolitical context and an overall low 
impact in Brazil’s trade balance. However, it is necessary to take into account 
the internationalization movements and some political and economic ten-
dencies accelerated by the deepening of globalization.
Brazil is beginning to be a capital and technology exporter, besides a 
traditional (and now competitive) exporter of primary products, services and 
manufactures. The phenomenon taking place in Brazil is also observed in 
other developing economies, as India, South Africa and China. Africa is one 
of the most adequate territories for the Brazilian companies to invest, even 
though the continent is marked by some unstable regimes, armed conflicts 
and other forms of violence, significant sanitary issues and immense poverty. 
Meanwhile, it is one of the few natural frontiers still open to the expansion 
of business in sectors such as oil, gas and minerals extraction and stage 
of a global dispute for the access to raw materials, increasingly scarce and 
demanded.
With the beginning of his second term of office, Lula made his sev-
enth trip to the continent, visiting Burkina Faso, the Republic of the Congo, 
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South Africa and Angola8. The agenda, besides the signature of bilateral and 
multilateral agreements, included the participation in the 2nd India, Brazil 
and South Africa Dialogue Forum Summit. The travel to Burkina Faso, retrib-
uting the visit to Brazil of president Baise Compaoré, in 2003, allowed to 
agreements of technical cooperation in the educational area and a protocol 
for cooperation in health sectors such as traditional medicine and milk banks. 
Retributing the president Denis Sassou Ngueso’s visit to Brazil in 2005, in 
the Republic of the Congo the countries agreed on the fight against malaria 
and HIV/AIDS. When the travel was done, the Brazilian president had visited 
19 of the 52 African countries, some of them more than once9.
Nevertheless, the biggest investment was in diplomatic terms. In 
2007, by participating, in South Africa of the 2nd IBSA Summit (the first 
one took place in Brasília, in September 2006), the Brazilian diplomacy 
intensified trilateral cooperation and political articulation10. The reform of 
the United Nations Security Council and the Doha Development Round were 
some of the discussed matters. The WTO negotiation round is a priority 
for all three countries, because they integrate the G-20 and, together, fight 
for the opening of the agricultural market of the developed countries to the 
production of those in development.
In any way, the formation of the IBSA will already have played an 
important role by pointing out to the North countries the intention of the 
South countries of having their voice heard about the big global themes and 
will have, to some extent, influenced the G-8 to invite them to their internal 
debates. The IBSA, in this sense, is succeeding in projecting its members 
in the international stage, alerting the global community that the countries 
8 The president was, this time, accompanied by businessmen in the energy, construction, 
aeronautic industry and finances sectors. An agreement regarding biofuels was also signed, 
with the Economic Community of West African States, as well as a cooperation regarding the 
cotton industry, besides a business event, during the visit to Burkina Faso. In the Republic of 
the Congo, the countries signed agreements about palm growing and modernization of the 
sugar-alcohol sector. 
9 Since the beginning of the Lula administration, Brazilian exports to Africa more than 
tripled – in 2003, Brazil exported US$ 3.06 billion, in 2006 they were US$ 7.86 billion. In 
2007, the data up until September showed a growth of 15% in comparison to the former year. 
10 The countries also established daring aims to the increase of trilateral trade. In July 2007, 
during the 4th Trilateral Ministerial Commission Meeting, in New Delhi, the Brazilian Minis-
ter of Foreign Relations, Celso Amorim, proposed a goal of US$ 15 billion until 2010. During 
that year, Brazil, India and South Africa intended to reach US$ 10 billion in commercial 
exchanges. In the occasion, Amorim also defended the creation of a free trade zone between 
Mercosur, India and the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), group that includes South 
Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland.
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are willing and able to break the limitations of their regional contexts and 
decisively contribute to the advance of a multipolar order. Finally, the Forum 
opened an important political space to the international action of South Africa 
and Brazil.
The possibilities for commercial exchange were, as well, one of the 
main topics of the bilateral meeting of president Lula with the South-African 
president Thabo Mbeki, In the political sphere the governments agreed on 
instruments on the social, energetic, educational, cultural, health and trib-
utary administration areas. In South Africa, the president also partook in a 
Business Council, Academic Seminar, Parliamentary Forum and Women 
Forum. The end of the trip was in Angola, where Lula, with his Angolan 
counterpart José Eduardo dos Santos, signed treaties regarding the preven-
tion of malaria, teaching and graduation. In Luanda, the Brazilian president 
was honored in a solemn session of the National Assembly and opened a 
business meeting with representatives of more than 30 Brazilian companies 
installed in the country.
Angola, Africa’s second biggest oil producer, was stage for an intense 
discussion regarding what president Lula called a “biofuel revolution”. 
According to him, both countries – Angola as an oil power and Brazil as 
self-sustaining in its production – could together be part of the next energy 
revolution, of the biofuels. The “Brazilian energy revolution”, as announced 
by the president, has in the Brazilian potential to the production of ethanol 
an exit to the substitution of non-renewable energy to clean energy sources. 
The importance given to the theme by the Brazilian government is clear, and 
it has been approaching other countries on the subject, aiming the develop-
ment and improvement of this energy source.
In November 2007, Brazil and China announced they would release 
free of charge to all of Africa images of the China-Brazil Earth Resources 
Satellite (CBERS). The announcement, made by the Brazilian delegation 
during the 4th meeting of the Group on Earth Observations (GEO), in Cape 
Town, had the objective of increasing the capability of governments and 
organizations in Africa to the monitoring of natural disasters, deforestation, 
drought and desertification, threats to agricultural production and food secu-
rity, and threats to the public health. Beyond providing high quality satellite 
images, Brazil also committed to the providing of the necessary software for 
the processing and other tools required to the interpretation of the images, 
as well as the training of interested African users.
The relations between Brazil and Africa, during the second Lula 
government, leaned towards an deepening. In December 2007, Brazil was 
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chosen by the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) to coordinate the organ’s 
works in Guinea Bissau. The choice followed requests made by the country 
itself. In the coordination of the PCB works to the Guinea Bissau, Brazil will 
increase its contribution to the country, already evident though the bilateral 
cooperation, as well as through the CPLP and the IBSA Fund. In March 2008, 
because of severe floods affecting Mozambique and Zambia, Brazil reinforced 
initiatives of humanitarian help to the African nations, donating 3 tons of 
basic and emergency drugs to each of the countries, as well as continuing 
the support to Guinea Bissau and Angola, also affect by the disasters.
Despite being impossible to precisely determine the impacts of the 
favorable conjuncture to the rapprochement between Brazil and the African 
continent, it is a fact that Africa is in a privileged position within the inter-
national insertion strategy developed by Lula’s foreign policy. Brazil seems 
to wish to be a responsible and active actor in the international system and, 
historically, Itamaraty has been the institution that, with excellency, plans the 
long-term national interest. Granting greater importance to regions yet poorly 
explored and developing countries, without neglecting the well-established 
relations with more traditional partners, does not only agrees with a broader 
definition of national interests and Brazil’s insertion in the global economy, 
but also contributes to the conferring of legitimacy to the Brazilian diplomacy.
If during the Dilma Rousseff government it is possible to observe a 
certain “recess” in the intensity of the relations with the continent, it is worth 
mentioning that Africa’s importance to the Brazilian policy can be shown in 
numbers. According to the World Bank/Ipea Report (2012), in 2009, 50% 
of Brazil’s projects financed by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC, in 
the Portuguese acronym), were destined to the African continent. In 2011, 
that value increased to almost 60%, accounting for more than US$ 22 bil-
lion. Even though the validity of becoming involved with poorer countries, 
with a limited participation in Brazil’s trade balance draws criticism, Africa 
has shown to be a great destination to Brazil’s exports and investments, 
besides being a route to Indian Ocean. Moreover, as the Report stresses, 
Brazil’s knowledge in the fields of tropical agriculture and health constitute 
a unique opportunity to the African countries to import effective solutions to 
the development of both areas. Furthermore, the imports of Brazilian social 
protection services are highlighted. The similar social inequality situation in 
both shores of the Atlantic, the apparent success of social programs such the 
Fome Zero, led to the implementation of adaptations of these social support 
systems in countries like Angola, Kenya and Senegal, from 2003. Despite 
being still early to make an assessment of the results obtained so far, the 
initiatives are examples of Brazil’s long-term participation in the continent.
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The similar interests in both shores of the ocean, the search for joint 
solutions to common problems, the importance to safeguard the peace in a 
way that strengthens regional development and integrations, and the growing 
trade flow with the southern African nations comprise the main points of 
Brazil’s African policy.
Conclusion
It is important to point out that, to Brazil, Africa is not only a link 
to Asia. The South Atlantic has been serving as stage for the discovery of a 
wealth of natural resources, such as the Brazilian pre-salt, but also the oil 
reserves in the Angolan shore, where Brazil is already investing and cooper- 
ating regarding the providing of the technical resources needed to the explo-
ration. The affirmation of sovereignty over the territorial waters, the mainte-
nance of safety of navigation in the oceans and the blocking of any attempts 
by extra regional powers to militarize the region are, thus, urgent. It is worth 
considering, yet, the North-American need to control safer and less expensive 
reserves than the Venezuelan and Middle Eastern ones, besides the close 
military relation of the country with South Africa – a country that could be 
a gateway to Africa and, ergo, the South Atlantic region.
Despite the criticism, the development of military capabilities by 
regional powers is indispensable, while the emphasis on the  Zopacas must 
be reinforced, especially given the attempts to militarize the region, as shown 
by the situation in the Malvinas (Great-Britain), the recreation of the IV 
Fleet (Unites States of America) and the AFRICOM (United States Africa 
Command), besides the North-American insertion in the South American 
continent, with its bases in Colombian territory.
The great potential to the transformation of the South Atlantic in 
a security and energy supply community, as an option to the Euro-North- 
-American North Atlantic system, is perceived by the Brazilian foreign policy. 
Brazil seeks to lead the consolidation of this project, something that seems 
to be succeeding through the country’s assertive international projection 
policy. In this sense, South Africa, possessing a central position between the 
Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and a strong economy, makes it impossible to any 
country to disregard it when seeking to act in the continent (Kornegay 2011).
It is fundamental to stress that the regional conflicts resolution in 
Africa (as exemplified by Angola and South Africa) boosted an “African 
turnaround”, allowing Brazil to act in the rapprochement with and between 
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these countries. The expansion of these relations is important to increase the 
options within the SADC, which may generate a joint maritime security plan 
capable of bringing the region closer to Brazil, ergo, strengthening IBAS. 
While the South Atlantic does not possess an institutionalized organization, 
such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the international rela-
tions in the region shall lead to a transatlantic maritime security architecture 
(Kornegay 2011). In this sense, the creation of the Council of South American 
Defense, under the leadership of Brazil, must be taken into account.
Diplomatic discourse and practice during the Lula government con-
verged on building preferential alliances with partners within the scope of 
South-South relations. The Dilma Rousseff government maintained interest 
in relations with the continent, but redefined this axis in terms of priority. 
However, the African continent represented one of the areas of greatest invest-
ment in diplomatic terms during the 2000s. The approach to the African 
continent is not aimed at obtaining results in the short term, even though, 
in economic terms, Africa represents an important market. 
 In this sense, today, despite being weakened by the events 
of the political crisis in the country, Brazil’s African policy is dynamic in the 
diplomatic sphere, assuming special relevance when considering Brazil-
ian actions on the African continent. However, the political, economic and 
socio-cultural dynamics of both regions, at different historical moments, 
blocked or boosted this relationship. In different periods, Brazilian actions 
resulted from a misreading of the priorities of Brazilian foreign policy. These 
actions, which did not take into account long-term political and strategic 
interests, only immediate economic and financial interests, postponed the 
implementation and renewal of bilateral projects, as well as the establishment 
of multilateral cooperation agreements. Thus, it is necessary to monitor the 
trajectory of relations between Brazil and Africa.
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ABSTRACT
The Brazilian relations with the African continent, after a long period of estrange-
ment, gained a new momentum since the 2000’s. The historical links, the consol-
idation of a Brazilian policy of Africa and the important changes on the African 
continent are present in the Brazilian perspective about the need of rapprochement 
and cooperation. The discourse and the diplomatic practice converge to the building 
of preferential alliances with partners in the context of South-South relations. In this 
perspective, the African continent represents one of the largest investment areas in 
diplomatic terms from the recent governments. And still, the building of a strategic 
space that connects Brazil to the African coast makes the Atlantic Ocean an area to be 
preserved for cooperation between both sides. In this sense, this study evaluates the 
interaction between Brazil and the African continent and analyses the Brazil-Africa 
relations, especially Lusophone Africa, in the framework of South-South Cooperation. 
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